

Infrastructure and Development: Catalysis or Cataclysms in Africa? The case of fadama farming in Nigeria

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Perhaps the greatest achievement ever attained by human beings is how they 'captured' nature through science. Nonetheless, it seems the greatest obstacle yet to be conquered is the human being itself. This obstacle is, perhaps, informed by the former preceding the latter since it is still the understanding of science that is being applied to the understanding of human beings! What is often concocted is the direct application of scientific theories and methodologies which, in its initial historical emergence, was never a completely worked schema. In its development garb, science is applied to human welfare in form of infrastructural projects which are assumed to be conditional for the attainment of 'human comfort' and 'desire'. It has always been a 'working to the answer' leading, in the main, to cataclysms rather than catalysing development. The paper brings this out clearly in the assessment of a World Bank sponsored project in Nigeria. It found that even though the development community no longer claims a unilineal development paradigm, couched in terms of development cooperation recognizing indigenous peculiarities, the reality on ground proves otherwise. Furthermore, rather than catalysing development, more problems are in the offing than those proposed to have been solved.

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Introduction

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the concern for poverty eradication in the world, especially for Africa, has been very tremendous. It is as if all earlier attempts have failed and there is a need to reinvigorate development initiatives by tackling poverty headlong. Perhaps the most astounding is the Millennium Development Project, adopted at the Millennium Summit in September 2000 during which the largest gathering of world leaders ever in history committed themselves to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty by setting out a time-bound target of 2015. Regarding the quantifying feature of natural sciences and the usually expected visible or manifest empirically grounded 'development' policies, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were set to include:

- Eradication of extreme hunger and poverty
- Achievement of universal primary education
- Promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women
- Reduction of child mortality
- Improvement of maternal health
- Combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensuring environmental sustainability and
- Creation of a global partnership for development with targets for aid, trade and debt relief.

By 2006, in spite of the significant progress in achieving many of these goals, sub-Saharan Africa is still described as the 'epicenter of crisis, with continuing food insecurity, a rise in extreme poverty,

stunningly high rate of child and maternal mortality and a large number of people living in squalor and a widespread shortfall for most of the MDGs' (Millennium Project, 2007).

Indeed, it has been argued that the sorry case of Africa has not been limited to these MDGs but, for a fact, a 'failed economic (and one may add, political) history' (Payne and Lee, 2006). From dictatorship after independence, to corruption during and after this period, Africa's history has been disappointing. For example Nigeria, with about 2% of the world population and the greatest exporter of its immense oil and gas, is a key challenge to development practitioners because its economic performance is 'startlingly poor' (Jerome, 2007). Ironically, as he further observed, the oil curse is not unique to Nigeria. He states:

For many oil-producing developing countries and countries in transition, petroleum revenues make up a substantial share of gross domestic product, national and state budgets, and foreign exchange earnings. The potential to utilize oil revenue to create wealth is tremendous but, more often than not, it is mismanaged. Controlling for income level, countries that are highly dependent on revenues from oil and other minerals score lower on the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI), exhibit greater corruption, have a greater probability of conflict in any five-year period, and have larger shares of their population in poverty.
(p.82)

In an attempt to proffer explanations to this 'abnormal' picture, the contention has been that oil dependency and the allure it generated, through government contracts in financing large-scale public expenditure programmes, spawned socioeconomic distortions, including endemic corruption. Yet, public expenditures, it has been argued, are necessary for the provision of infrastructures for economic growth and 'development' (Bougheas, Demetiades and Mamuneas, 2000; Rienstra and Nijkamp, 1997; Wylie, 1996; Aschauer, 1993, 1989; Munnell, 1992).

It is of significant importance to observe, however, that the idea of 'public works' for development was a requirement of capitalist economies just as laws and monetary systems are perceived to be fundamental (Altshuler, 1989). It was, for colonized African territories, an economic necessity for ensuring 'peace', 'good health', and so on, in the colonies and transporting raw materials to the colonial headquarters (Akurang-Parry, 2000; Lawal, 1994; Olutayo, 1991; Malmsten, 1977; Abbott, 1971; Ady, 1943). Interestingly, the replacement of 'public works' with 'infrastructure' is a phenomenon of the 1980s. The word itself did not appear in the leading dictionary of the seventies. Its appearance in the United States, observes Altshuler (1989), was as a result of both the decline in infrastructural spending on public works and the 'need' identified, albeit without any sound intellectual foundation in the report of two volumes on United States infrastructure, commissioned by the Congress in 1984.

Aschauer (1993; 1989), in his various works, has shown that infrastructures, viewed as important inputs in the provision of public goods, are not only central to economic growth but also explain the productivity slowdown in the US. Indeed, Wylie (1996) found that rates of return have not only been high in infrastructure investment in Canada but also that public infrastructure has had a significant and positive role to play in national economic growth and productivity far more than in the United States. Conceived as a technology that reduces costs in the production of intermediate inputs and, therefore, fosters specialization, infrastructure accumulation, Bougheas et al. (2000) found out, using cross-country data, is very productive. They however cautioned that policy implications, with regard to poor countries, should not be hurriedly acknowledged since they do not rely on their own resources for infrastructure accumulation. This caution is apposite even when private provision is now being considered.

As Rienstra and Nijkamp (1997: p.244) observed, historically for the Netherlands, 'private provision is not feasible'. This is also true for the poor countries especially, as they further concluded, 'complete

networks will not come into existence, because several links are not profitable or too risky for private investors'. These risks may be political or due to changes in law or new regulations or even nationalization. Historically, it has also been shown, from the proceedings on historical dimensions of development in 1994, that the 'actual practice of development project is still very much geared towards establishing what A is, and what B should be, and how to proceed from one to the other' (van den Berg and Bosma, 1994: 19). This has been the task the World Bank continues to set for itself.

As such, and in spite of the problems associated with the provision of infrastructures, its centrality to the institution of a market economy, has been vigorously pursued by the World Bank leading the other development agencies. Its publication of the 1994 World Development Report on *Infrastructure for Development* laid the foundation for the position of the World Bank, which declared itself as the 'Knowledge Bank' in 1996, having identified and established its market orientation in the 'From Plan to Market' document of the same year. The attempts of the bank have been to entrench this position through the re-engineering of *The State in a Changing World* 1997 report by recognizing how vital the state is to economic development and making it more effective in creating the enabling environment for markets to thrive and to address social issues. These have led to the imposition of public sector reforms as indicated in its *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy published in 2000*. Nonetheless, these reforms recognized the need to work with partner countries in identifying competition and the 'voices' from within the partner nations. Thus the bank, along with its role as the leading centre of knowledge, also became the champion of public sector reforms, including anti-corruption crusades.

It was against this background that the 2000/01 *Attacking Poverty* document was prepared as 'the analytical foundation for the bank's own institutional strategy for development' (WDRs- Synopsis of WDRs 1995-2005), having prepared the 1999/2000 *Entering the 21st Century* report on the basis of the

recognition of the gains and pains of globalization and localization but with emphasis on economic growth driven by the urban sector considered as the foci of population and industry. As such, the provision of infrastructural services, translating to the MDGs, again, came to the fore as the expected catalyst for trade and capital flows. Yet this was to be packaged within a 'regulatory framework and supporting fiscal institutions' within which to 'guide' receiving nations, especially the poor ones. Within this ambit, actions of the countries and communities would not be enough but would have to be complemented by global actions. Consequently, the 2002 report on *Building Institutions for Markets* attempted to tackle the question of corruption as it builds institutions to support markets which promote economic growth and reduce poverty. And the 2003 report was to encourage sustainable development by examining the complex relationship between the reduction of poverty, maintaining economic growth, improving social cohesion, and protecting the environment. These were to be tackled by *Making Services Work for the Poor* forming the focus of the 2004 report thus returning, within a decade, to the question of infrastructure. The provision of these infrastructures has, however, been taken from the public/government domain and now the business of both international and non-governmental/civil society organizations.

In spite of all these efforts, the major nagging questions are, taking into cognizance the appalling experience of the poor nations, why have the reforms persistently, seemingly, failed? Succinctly put, while economic reforms are desirable, are the mechanisms put in place sufficient to catalyse development without a fundamental transformation of the social structure? Just as in what turned out to be a conjectured evolutionary paradigm, is the infrastructure dilemma being labelled as hindrance to development in Africa not a 'working to the answer'? That is, having established a theoretical neo-classical orientation, is what is being done not to 'look for what we want to see' to ensure compliance to our predetermined goal? This seems to be the pattern in most write-ups in the World-Bank sponsored researches. For instance, what Montiel (2006) in a

paper he described as 'conceptual' titled 'Obstacles to Investments in Africa: Explaining the Lucas Paradox' is itself a paradox as 'obstacles' are being searched for in 'obstacles'! (See also Elumelu n.d; Gambari, 2003 and so on). Again, at the risk of overemphasis, the essence of creating infrastructure is to enhance trade. But has this ever been able to favour the poor?

Through a qualitative research methodology, this paper addresses the issue by examining a World-Bank initiative in Nigeria designed to attack poverty through the empowerment of the people by providing infrastructures for development. The remaining part of the paper is divided into three sections. The next section presents the history of the fadama projects in Nigeria after which the methodology and data gathered therefrom is analysed through a critical assessment of secondary materials/data and the content analysis of the in-depth interviews conducted. Pictures taken during transect walks and direct observations of the projects are also presented. The final section concludes the paper.

A Brief History of the Fadama Projects in Nigeria

Fadama is the traditional Hausa word for low-lying flood plains. Its use for cultivation, apart from fishing (Sarch, Madakan and Ladu, 1997), had been of immense benefit in indigenous agricultural practices before the colonial period and of Northern African origin (Blench, 2003a). A short growing season and the variability of rainfall both within a season and between years, as well as the recurrence of drought are important constraints on agriculture in Northern Nigeria thus necessitating fadama for soil water conservation for the extension of the growing season beyond the rains. Indeed, the officers of the colonial government recognized its importance and encouraged this method of farming. However, increasingly, the method came into disrepute as the development perspective hinged on the need to import technology came to the fore. Formal irrigation became the new norm even when, in comparison, traditional irrigation for cropping is more than three times efficient (Adams, 1986). Indeed, the Federal Government of Nigeria has developed a National

Irrigation Policy and Strategy to include private participation based on the guidelines provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and the review of the public irrigation schemes (FGN, 2005). Essentially, this policy is to ensure the production of food and fibre for the urban areas and the international market without, it seems, considering the overall impact on the rural structure. On the other hand, the fadama project, it seems, has been established to cater for the rural people. The extent to which this has been achieved is the main focus of this section.

The formalization of the fadama project began in the 1990s 'to promote simple and low-cost improved irrigation technology under the World Bank' (African Development Fund 2003). The second phase, or was it new, was said to have been implemented by 2006 and the third, or is it newer, phase is starting in 2007. At each phase, one reason or the other was given for the need to continue the project. Apart from the so called new Rural Development Strategy adopted by the Federal Government in 2001, in line with the African Development Bank's strategic plan, which focuses on poverty reduction, private sector promotion and participatory approaches to development, the second phase was justified with the argument that the first neglected 'downstream activities such as processing, preservation and conservation and rural infrastructure to ensure the efficient evacuation of farm output to markets' as well as the neglect of other resource use such as those for livestock and fisheries production and the design and implementation shortcomings. In recommending that the project be funded to the tune of UA 22 million, the bank adjudged it to be 'financially and economically viable, technically feasible, socially desirable and environmentally sound' as it would benefit 'a total of 720,000 people in 6 states'. But to what extent have these been achieved?

Methodology and Data Analysis

This work is, in the main, informed by the in-depth interviews carried out between 3rd of May, 2007 and 25th June 2007 at the *Ajibode* Resettlement Area of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. It was as a result

of the direct observation of fadama activities in the area, since the organization was thought to be limited to the Northern part of Nigeria with the attendant limited rainfall/water (Water Report, 2005; FGN, n.d). From this limited observation, my curiosity was awakened to find out the overall fadama activities, though with specific attention on the *Ajibode* community. Due to monetary constraints, yet the need to be informed about the experience in other parts of the country, it was considered necessary to undertake a review of secondary materials with specific reference to the North, where the projects were first implemented. As such, three basic research methodologies constitute the basis of this work – the review of secondary materials; in-depth interviews and direct observations.

A Review of Secondary Materials

Generally, as noted in the introductory section, fadama projects are follow-ups to the attempts to alleviate poverty in Nigeria. The alleviation of poverty, however, seems to be limited to the provision of infrastructures without an adequate grasp of the socio-cultural and economic considerations. As Moritz (n.d) observed, conflicts over natural resources are major phenomena in semi-arid and sub-humid zones of West Africa. Indeed, in almost all human endeavours, the need to survive is always paramount and whatever constitutes a hindrance is bound to cause conflict. These have played themselves out clearly in Africa, in what Bennett (1991) has referred to as ‘green wars’ or, to Richards (2001), ‘desert wars’.

As Moritz et al (2002) once observed, these conflicts often arise as a result of modernization projects, though these may not always be the case. Blench (2003b;2005) has shown, in his findings from the study on natural resource conflict in relation to fadama, conducted to feed into the second phase of the project in Nigeria, that there have been major consequences of the project. These include: flooding, which results from rapid runoff of water into rivers once trees have been lost; water deficits, due to excessive takeoff and widening of the channel, causing high levels of evaporation; soil loss due to

collapses of the river bank; mineral leaching due to excessive runoff; replacement of diverse grassland with monospecific weed flora; and biodiversity reduction due to degraded habitats.

Of utmost significance, also, is the increasing violent conflicts arising from what Moritz (n.d) referred to as the ‘instrumentalization of disorder’ in neo-patrimonial states wherein the elites fan embers of discord in order to profit from the situation (see also, for the role of chiefs, USAID, 2004). Indeed, as Blench (2005) emphasized, because the dominant groups are the interlocutors of the donor agencies and the urban elites, attention is often directed away from significant issues with potential violent conflicts. As such, the needs of the politically articulate urban dwellers are inevitably placed above those of rural dwellers and when there is conflict, regulatory frameworks and infrastructure will favour urban dwellers.

Unfortunately, this is to the detriment of peaceful coexistence in the rural areas as thousands of people are killed from fall-outs of urban contestations over the sharing of the loots that ought to be for the rural dwellers (Blench, 2003b). In other words, while recognizing the economic benefits acclaimed to have been accrued to the rural dwellers in the appraisal report, the urban elites have not only benefited more but have also complicated the existing socio-cultural and economic relations. It is often appears as if, in the words of Fayolle, 2006:p.1, ‘the international community has lost sight of its ultimate goal: preventing the resumption of crisis (and its additional costs) . . .’ It is doubtful, therefore, if one can categorically assert that fadama projects ‘reduce(d) rural poverty by improving the living conditions of the rural poor and ...(has) contribute(d) to food security and increased access to rural infrastructure’ as well as enhancing agricultural production; productivity and value addition for small holders and rural entrepreneurs (‘Executive Summary’ ADF 2003). Even with the modest increasing profits to the rural entrepreneurs, the relative domination of market access by the urban traders needs to be considered (Olutayo, 2005). Indeed, as the Director of the Independent Evaluation Office of the International

Monetary Fund (IMF), Bernes (2007) surmised, in the foreword to the evaluation report on the IMF, undertaken between 1990-2005 (when the IMF introduced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), of the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), and the IMF transformed its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), and when the sub-Saharan Africa seems to be doing well in macroeconomic performance):

Lacking clarity on what they should do on the mobilization of aid, alternative scenarios, and the application of poverty and social impact analysis, IMF staff tended to focus narrowly on macroeconomic stability, in line with the institution's core mandate and their deeply professional culture. (p.vii)

This lack of understanding of the social impact due to its underestimation, as taken for granted, or, better still, its cloudiness constituted by the political and educated elites, is well borne out in the World Bank's *fadama* project in the *Ajibode* case study.

In-depth interviews

The in-depth interview conducted with the Ore-Ofe Ajibode Fadama Community Association (OOFCA) revealed that *fadama* was introduced to Ajibode, through Akinyele Local Government (ALG)¹ which has a *fadama* desk officer at its secretariat. This association is one of about fifteen other *fadama* associations in the local government. Several other *fadama* associations are also in other ten local governments of Oyo State with the intention of having representations in all the local government areas. Indeed, Ore-Ofe was, more or less, an appendage to the other fifteen associations in the ALG as it was not included in the list of associations as at January 2004 when the programme began in Oyo State, as part of the Second phase of *fadama* in the country. (see Appendix 1 for associations recognized and the total project cost under each

head). In fact, the recognition of Ajibode was more of clientelistic relationship as, according to the chairman;

Secretariat (ALG) introduced one of its staffs [sic] living in Ajibode who mobilized the people for the meeting with the facilitators in October 2004 without any grouping at the time . . .

(Interview with the Chairman of OOFCA, 15th April, 2007)

Interestingly, this staff of the local government, an indigene of Ajibode, is a known politician of the ruling party. This individual, according to informants, resides outside the community and is one of the land speculators in the area. Selling of lands, it was asserted, is a controversial issue in *Ajibode* and the 'staff' is an active participant in the latent conflicts surrounding land sales. It is not surprising, therefore, that the people forming the nucleus of the association were his proteges. From an interview with one of the association members, it was gathered that his main representative in the community, also one of the land speculators, became the association secretary and his sister, now late, the treasurer.

Since the community association is expected to comprise of different groups representing the women/widows; the youth; livestock farmers; vegetable farmers; fish farmers; as the 'poor' in the community, a December 2004 meeting ensured that these interest groups were formed, except that of the youth. Each 'trade' group, with obvious overlapping of names, selected its own executives- as the minutes of meetings show. From the interview with one of the members in the fish farmers' group - *Osi'oyemi* meaning 'poverty does not suit me'- Fadama Cooperative Fish Farmers' Association, it is clear that even the groups could not stand on their own as the concern of each member is 'what is in it for me?'. They are not interested in contributing even the money to register the cooperative associations. It was, for instance, only one man who volunteered to 'loan' the fish group money for registration. A more or less mini-patron, he was also the one who assisted to register the coordinating OOFCA. A well known

¹ Ajibode is located within Akinyele Local Government Area of Oyo State

fish farmer in the community, he only registered some people's names as, more or less, a camouflage using his own farm as what the group possesses. No member of the group had or still has a fish farm. According to him:

Many people joined when they realized money given by fadama was not to be refunded so they only came for their shares when the money came....It was not because they were interested in fish farming....

(Interview March 10, 2007)

Nonetheless, vegetable growers seem to have benefited immensely from the activities of the local government coordinated fadama. With the money allocated to them, they bought three pumping machines, cutlasses, rakes and other equipment relevant to their occupation. As stated by one of the interviewees, this is the only group that is most organized perhaps because they had been in this profession before the coming of fadama. Indeed, they have profited immensely for their association with OOFCA though other activities that would have enhanced these advantages further incapacitated them. Such is in the area of central organization for the provision of infrastructures like culverts and pumping machines by OOFCA. The culverts are to assist in reducing cost of road transportation of their vegetables to the markets outside the community, while the pumping machines are to reduce the time spent in fetching water at home. The widows' association also gained from the OOFCA on the 'plan we wrote for them', using the money the widows contributed. Some of these widows bought some things like sewing machines and refrigerators to fend for themselves. However, these things were not what they planned along with the facilitators because the contributions from fadama 'could not go round the members, so they had to add more money'. For the 'fishermen', a member states:

We were badly treated. Initially, there was an approval of ₦800000 to dig and fence our farms. But on the long run it was only ₦230000 that was finally approved. And the

number of fishermen was about 25. The money could not do the fencing and to acquire new pond farm

(Interview March 2007)

Perhaps these groups would not have bothered asking for infrastructures like boreholes and culverts. 'The facilitators', the interviewees asserted, 'decided our fate'. These facilitators, one of the interviewees stated, have not worked before, they don't have the experience of the work they are doing. According to the chairman of OOFCA and another member of one of the small groups interviewed, the identification of needs for the community began after the December, 2004 meeting. Facilitators from the state fadama office entered into deliberations in early 2005 where the OOFCA

. . . suggested many things such as boreholes; market-place; recreational facilities; road works; among others....We thought they would give us all we asked for (but) they gave us a limit as to how much and what they can give.

Unfortunately,

What we even expected from them is not what we've received from them....We were not given the amount they promised to spend for us because the building of market is not in place; road-works not in place. Out of the six we asked for only two were given that is borehole and culverts.... It is as if there is a blue-print from Washington, Federal/State/local governments on which we have nothing to say. We could not query them whatever they gave us.

(Interview March 2007)

Ironically, the borehole and culvert projects have not been well implemented. None of the three boreholes sunk functioned for up to six months due to inappropriate implementation processes (See the pictures). According to the Chairman of OOFCA:

All the activities of awarding the contract, though done in conjunction with the fadama executives, it was the fadama desk office that invited the contractors; interviewed them and sorted out the quotations, and the suitable contractors contracted by them. What we do was just to supervise to make sure the work was carried out

(Interview 15th April 2007)

This seems to be contrary to the laid-down procedure guiding participatory rural development. In addition, the association members were to 'supervise' the work they know little or nothing about! The contractors did the geological surveys for the boreholes and one of the members of the OOFCA was awarded the construction of a culvert, having gone through the interview process. From direct observation, the culverts have compounded the road problems with the rains that began in late May. The contractor to this project, interestingly, was the secretary to the association. It should be noted that it was this same secretary representing the interest of the ALG staff who introduced the project to the community.

Conclusion

Development is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. As such it is a complex endeavour requiring painstaking considerations without any assumed knowledge of the situation. On the contrary, however, development, since the beginning of the twentieth century, especially with the triumph of capitalism towards the end of that century, has been perceived as clearly defined and discernible. Thus, many development plans and policies have been designed but failed, and are still failing. Characteristic of twenty-first century development practices is the emphasis on infrastructures.

Infrastructures as development harbingers are, themselves, complex. This is especially so because they encompass both the obvious- in terms of what Jahan and McCleery (2005: p.5) call the 'physical features of civilization, such as roads, bridges and highways; transport and ports; basic utilities such as power, water, and sanitation; and also schools, health

care facilities and public buildings' as well as 'infrastructural services, which include the social and economic benefits associated with infrastructure per se'. The benefits deriving from these are expected to trickle down to the poor. Due to the uncertainty of these expected trickle-down effects, however, it is now recognized that infrastructures can be local and community based because, it is argued, 'the small, local and community based infrastructure...may make a direct contribution in raising the well-being of poor people' (my emphasis) who constitute more than half of the populations in the developing countries. Yet, as the authors cited above observed, the ultimate success of poverty reduction through infrastructural development is conditional. It is this conditionality that has persistently hindered the synergy of theory and praxis. That conditionality is the human being, that is the socio-structural organization of human beings. This has been exemplified in Nepal, where simple indigenous technology is utilized in the production of technologies such as micro-hydro electric power generation units and biogas plants among others, leading to considerable improvement in people's lives at low and affordable cost (Dixit 2007). The new technologies that have worked have been indigenously designed, based on traditional skills and knowledge, and are cheap and easy to use and maintain. In fact, to visit Nepal these days, according to Dixit (2007) is to see the 'small is beautiful' concept of development. Thus this commendable example would reduce cost, waste and involve more people in development rather than the top-bottom approach to development.

As alluded to in the findings of this study, the whole process of poverty reduction through fadama was not only a top-bottom development strategy, politically motivated through clientelistic relationships, and elusive of the poor, it was also an elite based programme. And, as Jahan and McCleery (2005) concluded:

Until a pluralistic, participatory society emerges, government tends to remain dominated by existing elites who resist any project that will radically alter the existing status quo (p.47)

Interestingly, infrastructures require physical structures that would be purchased. From this, the elites can and are always enriching themselves through corrupt practices and sustaining their relevance to their clients (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007; Omobowale, 2006). This is the major feature of the fadama projects, like many others, as they have been and are being instituted in Nigeria.

While it is a fact that economic development is a pre-requisite to meeting, at least, basic needs over a long time, it cannot take place without a clear understanding of socio-structural arrangements, which is often neglected by development agencies. This neglect is, perhaps, almost inevitable because of the unavoidable inclusion of the government and its staff who perceive attempts at empowering the poor as a means to make some extra money. Consequently, it further compounds the problem as the so called 'modern' educated civil servants as carriers of civilization, apart from the political elites, effectively block pro-poor projects unless they gain from it. As such there seems to be a fundamental behavioural problem with the ruling elites. This is perhaps why the question of governance has been variously identified as significant in understanding the poverty status in transition economies (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and Schankerman, (2000); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido, 1999; Ritzen, Easterly and Woolcock n.d; Kaufmann and Wei, n.d). Corruption has eaten deep into the fabrics of transition economies beyond the formal sector. Thus, it is not only an expectation of gradual change in behaviour. It requires a fundamental purge and, hence, a redefinition of the situation. Consequently, a microscopic, micro-sociopolitical and economic as well as a contextual analysis of the situation is necessary for the understanding of transition economies. Not just the macro-economic and political window-dressing.

To achieve this probably requires a new approach to understanding the behaviour of both the ruling and the ruled in these economies. While various answers have been provided relating to their 'prebendal'; 'rentier-seeking' characteristics resulting from, perhaps, cultural disruption tendencies; or indigenous

cultural practices; military coups; and so on, little or no attention seems to have been directed at the method of acquiring knowledge, what type of knowledge, in whose interest and for what purpose. The nature of the disjuncture between the knowledge and the purpose, for which it is meant, therefore, needs to be further explored.

With this realization, economic empowerment is, perhaps, only feasible where the poor people not only define and identify what they need but also are able to explore and exploit their environments themselves in satisfying these needs. In other words, modernization needs to be re-conceptualized to mean the acquisition and enhancement of knowledge through the understanding of the environment by the people, for the people, and in the interests of the people. It is not to be defined by 'outsiders'. There are definitely indigenous knowledge structures that can be explored and exploited but which 'imported' foreign knowledge has stifled through the top-bottom approach to education and development. This is what governments should be encouraged to include in school curricula-by learning from below. Even when we recognize social divisions among the people, therefore, consensus and conflict as well as conflict resolution strategies are to be arranged by themselves.

Furthermore, while it is true that trade and aid/assistance can enhance development, there is a need to be cautious of the disruptive effects such implies for the receiving nation (see Mishra and Topalova (2007) showing mixed results). The absorption, as the International Monetary Fund now expects (Plant and Gupta, 2007), in terms of using aid to boost the incorporation of imported goods and services in receiving nations would only return the argument back to the dependency ideas of the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, the UNCTAD (2007) report on the least developed countries, of which more than 95% is located in Africa, has shown that, against the backdrop of current pattern of technology flows to these countries, through international trade, foreign direct investment and intellectual property licensing, the knowledge divide has continued to widen thus exacerbating poverty. This is apart from

the de-skilling of indigenous professions as technologies imported change, over which they have no control (Fitzgerald, 1993). Except these nations are geared to recreate technology through innovation, which is impossible within the present international arrangement, development would continue to be a mirage. Thus, they have to find their own way their own way.

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APPENDIX 1

Oyo State Fadama Development Office Second National Fadama Development Project

Local Government	Fadama Community Association	Rural Infrastructure	Pilot Asset Acquisition	Capacity Building	Advisory Services	Project Contribution
	Ogo Oluwa	675 000.00	1 287 63.50	650 000.00	585 000.00	3 197 863.50
Ibarapa North	Agbeloba	675000	1 194795.00	650 000.00	810000	3329795
	Ifelavo	1 125000.00	1 240 750.00	650 000.00	585 000.00	3600750
	Orelope	1440000	1 801 05.00	650 000.00	622 800.00	4514705
	Oluwalogbon	675000	1220520	799200	592380	3287100
	Alabi	630000	490000	2500000	900000	4520000
	Abidioki	630000	490000	2500000	900000	4520000
	Afokosoro	630000	490000	2500000	900000	4520000
	Sub-total	6480000	8215833.5	10899200	5895180	31490213.5
Iwajowa	labalave	675000	1 193255.00	900 000.00	810000	3 578,255.00
	Oluwalogbon	585 000.00	1174950	850 000.00	657000	3266 950.00
	liiomeso	495 000.00	941 500.00	850 000.00	657 000.00	2943 500.00
	Agbeloba	675000	1 580950.00	600 000.00	585000	3 440 950.00
	Orelope	720 000.00	1 588440.00	600000	592 200.00	3500640
	Ifesowapo	675 000.00	1 312500.00	700 000.00	648 000.00	3 335,500.00
	Araromi laanna	585000	1 403 500.00	500000	450 000.00	2 938 500.00
	Ola Oluwa	675 000.00	1 403 500.00	500000	450 000.00	3 028 500.00
	Aioda	720000	1 403 500.00	500000	450 000.00	3 073 500.00
	Olorunabewa	652 500.00	1 403 500.00	500000	450 000.00	3 006 000.00
	Sub-total	6457500	13405595	6500000	5749200	32112295
	Olorunsogo	Tiraka	879 158.66	596610	700000	235381.5
Aaneloba		400122.86	782495	700 000.00	493 555.50	2376 173.36
IvamaDo		610389.9	508 550.00	700 000.00	652 500.00	2471 439.90
Oasis		1 170000.00	1 919008.00	865 000.00	749700	4703708
Salvation		0	1 291 710.00	600000	540000	2431 710.00
Owonikoko		1 198 983.60	525 000.00	750 000.00	3 133 983.60	5607967.2
Imosokan		1 325 367.90	1 285 830.00	720 000.00	603675	3934872.9
Aabelere		954 324.00	1 339170.00	840 000.00	756000	3 889494.00
Iyalabake		0	1 400 000.00	500 000.00	450000	2 350 000.00
Sub-total		7213346.93	11048373	6875000	8064795.6	33201515.53
Orire	Dada Sorire	765000	1 605100.00	1 250 000.00	765 000.00	4385100
	Ola Oluwa	1122141.6	1 487 850.00	1100000	675 000.00	4 384 991.60
	Ibukun Oluwa	1 395 000.00	975 590.00	1 000 000.00	720000	4090590
	Irewumi	1 395000.00	975 590.00	1 000 000.00	720000	4090 590.00
	Elesun Adeosun	1 395 000.00	975590	1 000000.00	720 000.00	4090 590.00
	Sub-total	6072141.6	6019720	5350000	3600000	21041861.6
Surulere	Owonikoko Ilaie	1 638000.00	1 064 000.00	650 000.00	648000	4000000
	Ifelodun Arolu	2416500	1864975	650000	900000	5831475
	Ibukun Olu Ireaba	1953000	1236165	650000	585000	4424165
	Olorunda Iresaada	2142000	1036700	650000	774000	4602700
	Tepamose Iresaadu	2331000	1518230	650000	1080000	5579230
	Olaoluwa Oke Ireaba	1953000	726600	650000	648000	3977600
	IQbon Gambari	2124000	1009470	650000	657000	4440470
	Ifelolave Jabata	1980000	5414675	650000	1080000	9124675
	Toluwalase Iresaada	675000	5283530	650000	990000	7598530
	Mavin Koiola	675000	1750000	650000	585000	3660000
Ayetoro Alaqbede	675000	1750000	650000	585000	3660000	

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Oyo State Fadama Development Office Second National Fadama Development Project

Local Government	Fadama Community Association	Rural Infrastructure	Pilot Asset Acquisition	Capacity Building	Advisory Services	Project Contribution
Akinyele	Olubusun	1 170000.00	834 820.00	600000	540000	3 144 820.00
	Olorire	1 548 000.00	2 203 880.00	700 000.00	630 000.00	5 081 880.00
	Ilaive	585 000.00	1 041,390.00	600000	540 000.00	2 766 390.00
	Aseyori	1 170 000.00	3477915	500000	450000	5597915
	Itesiwau	1 179000.00	2 106440.00	600000	540000	4425440
	Agbeloba	756 000.00	2203250	700000	630000	4 289250.00
	Iteloiu	963 000.00	2135700	700 000.00	630 000.00	4 428 700.00
	Onibonla	1 692 000.00	2 094 855.00	600 000.00	450 000.00	4 836 855.00
	Ola Oluwa	585 000.00	1 935.430.00	700000	630000	3.850430.00
	Tanimola	963 000.00	2482 900.00	800 000.00	720 000.00	4 965 900.00
	Irewumi	0	3 961 020.00	800000	720 000.00	5481 020.00
	Boluwaduro	1 731 600.00	4069170	740000	638 640.00	7179410
	Alejolowo	2 025 000.00	2 845 500.00	700000	630 000.00	6200500
	Aabaiowo	3 501 000.00	2 543 380.00	600000	540 000.00	7184380
	Sub-total	17868600	33935650	9340000	8288640	69432890
Egbeda	Agbelere	1 350000.00	1 524 992.00	500 000.00	450 000.00	3 824 992.00
	Omoluabi	585 000.00	1 693195.00	500 000.00	450 000.00	3228195
	Iaba Otun	1 15+250.00	1 357930.00	500 000.00	450000	3462180
	Wakajave	0	2439143	600000	540000	3579.143.00
	Ore Ote	0	2 043 076.00	600000	540 000.00	3 183 076.00
	Ibukun Oluwa	0	2472218	600000	540000	3612218
	Akurodola	204570	1534260	750000	675000	3163830
	Kajola	0	1115863	600000	540000	2255863
	Binukomu	0	1095150	500000	450000	2045150
	Agbewumi	2250000	1925000	800000	720000	5695000
	Ilupeju	1350000	1524992	500000	450000	3824992
	Anu Oluwapo	1350000	1524992	500000	450000	3824992
	Awaye Akiti	1350000	1524992	500000	450000	3824992
	Jaleyemi	1350000	1524992	500000	450,000.00 -	3824992
	Owonikoko	1350000	1524992	500000	450000	3824992
Sub-total	12293820	24825787	8450000	7605000	53174607	
Ido	Acete	2740500	2 880 150.00	760000	711 000.00	7 091 650.00
	Amayederun	405000	2 872 625.00	650000	585 000.00	4512625
	Alatia	1010250	2347100	650000	585000	4592350
	Aladeowo	1575000	1943900	650000	585000	4753900
	Iabevinadun	873000	2259110	500000	612000	4244110
	Daai Ondiko	1674000	2613870	500000	612000	5399870
	Kiabi	1080000	1610000	600000	540000	3830000
	Oaanla Lasokun	1080000	1610000	600000	540000	3830000
	Odebode	1170000	1680000	600000	540000	3990000
	Sub-total	11607750	19816755	5510000	5310000	42244505
Ona Ara	Alafia	765 000.00	2 780 050.00	750000	748818	5043 868.00
	Agbelere	675000	1 321 250.00	450 000.00	396 000.00	2 842.250.00
	Olunloyo	1 260 000.00	1414945	620 000.00	522 000.00	3816945
	Oaunsola	2 381 400.00	972 860.00	900 000.00	810000	5064 260.00
	Kowowole	1 241 448.30	1 714545.00	766 500.00	1 041 750.00	4 764 243.30
	Akinkemi	1,127 250.00	1 686300.00	900 000.00	810000	4523550
	Oorelope	1 665 000.00	4 340 000.00	800 000.00	720000	7525.000.00
	Gbedun Elese Eri	2 250 000.00	1 053 500.00	800000	720 000.00	4 823 500.00
	Idera Oluwa	900 000.00	1 750000.00	700000	630 000.00	3 980 000.00
	Aabeioda	1 080000.00	1 750 000.00	700 000.00	630 000.00	4 160000.00
	Kebimacalu	990000	1 750 000.00	700 000.00	630 000.00	4070000
	Agbeloba	990 000.00	1 750 000.00	700000	630000	4070000
	Aabelaaba	1 170000.00	1 750 000.00	700000	630 000.00	4250 000.00
Sub-total	16495098.3	24033450	9486500	8918568	58933616.3	

Plate 1: Culvert




Plate 2: Hand pump

